



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

10. — *The Militia of the United States. What it has been. What it should be.* 8vo. Boston. 1864. pp. 130.

THE author of this pamphlet evidently brings to his task some personal experience, as well as very definite opinions upon the present defects and future needs of our militia system, or want of system; and he has fortified his opinions by a formidable array of testimony, drawn from such a wide variety of sources, embracing, as it seems to a cursory inspection, all the most accredited and competent authorities from the earliest days of the Union down to Governor Andrew's Message in 1864, that he appears to be justified in assuming them to be not his alone, but the result of the best experience that we have upon the subject. Whether he has fully established his position in all its details or not, it is clear that he has collected many of the materials indispensable to a thorough study of this momentous and impending question, and not hitherto accessible without great labor, — and for this, at least, he deserves the thanks of all good citizens. From reports and memoirs, from letters and speeches scattered through many volumes, from all sorts of utterances, official and casual, he has brought together a mass of documentary evidence of the best kind upon a variety of points connected with the militia system. We have here, in their own words, opinions of Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Franklin, Knox, Gaines, Hamilton, Madison, Gerry, Scott, Harrison, and many other persons of special experience at home and abroad, bearing upon the different details of the plan advocated by our author.

His positions are briefly as follows. We need “for the common defence” an organized military force, which should consist in part of a small standing army, but mostly of militia. This militia cannot be properly supplied by volunteers; nor, on the other hand, is it worth while to drill and equip all of the population who are capable of military service. But the active militia should consist of a select body, — the principles of selection being left, within certain limits, to the State authority, — to be paid for the time actually in service, uniformly organized and disciplined, and subject to a rigid, uniform code, and of course to Federal inspection, though not officered ordinarily by the general government. He acquiesces in the election of officers by the men whom they are to command as an unavoidable evil, — evil, not because the officers thus chosen are necessarily worse than if otherwise appointed, but because of the false relation thus created between the commander and the commanded. He would obviate its bad effects, first by a State examination, and secondly by a system of Federal inspection; and he recommends for this purpose, as well as for the sake of uniformity in

essentials throughout the militia, (in his view indispensable to high efficiency,) the establishment of a Federal Militia Staff, which shall be devoted to carrying into effect the direction of the Constitution that Congress shall have power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," by prescribing uniform rules of organization and discipline, and enforcing attention to them. This last clause, relating to discipline, seems to have remained hitherto inoperative. Yet it is second in importance only to the general authority to call out the militia, and is properly connected with it; for the barren privilege of recommending a form of discipline to the States, without a coextensive provision for enforcing it, is futile. Either the right of the general government is superfluous, and the common defence may be safely intrusted to State action, or else this right should be made a reality by supplying the means for its exercise. If the general government may "call out" the militia, it ought to be able to make sure, in advance of actual need, that there is a *militia*, worthy of the name, to call out.

The slackness of our fathers was owing in part, no doubt, to an extension of the not unnatural dread of standing armies to everything that had the look of fixed organization, or that tended to produce an *esprit de corps*, or to furnish a ready, compact weapon to a possible usurper. And the democratic instinct against centralization, and in favor of individual action, of rotation in office, of improvised administration, was aided perhaps as time went on by an apprehension similar in effect, though of different origin, among the opposite political party, — the dread of a democratic despotism on the French model. There is some foundation for such fears; an efficient army, whether of regulars or of militia-men, is more dangerous than an inefficient one. And while everything that goes to weaken organization goes so far to diminish efficiency for good, a state of real disorganization under a show of system is merely dangerous, without any counterbalancing advantage. A militia that cannot fight cannot be a sword in the hand of an intriguer, but neither can it be a shield against him; and if it encourage a false reliance, it is only a snare. But such fears are not very potent now. We shall hardly hear of them, except as a cover to the little ambitions of little side interests. Perhaps the chief cause of the torpor has always been the obstinate optimism of our people, too careless or too busy to believe in the reality of danger, — at least that it is real enough to justify the certain trouble and expense of preparation to meet it. A real militia would sadly interfere with business; the militia accordingly became simply an idle pageant. Probably the minds of most persons are disabused of this amiable weakness for some time to come. And the States-right feeling is not likely at present to form any seri-

ous impediment in the minds of thoughtful men, — not because of the temporary set of the tide towards centralization, but because our fathers' faith in the people has become sight to us. We have believed that the real interest of each man and each section of the country was the interest of all and of every part, and that the people generally were enlightened enough to perceive this; and acting upon this belief, we have found it true. We do not need, therefore, to substitute for this *consensus* an arrangement that presupposes it to be false.

Many other suggestions of obvious importance are made by our author, all looking to the same end of a comparatively small body of uniformly disciplined militia, with a large latent force to fall back upon. Among these suggestions is that of the general introduction of elementary drill into schools, a measure commended by independent advantages, and to which we hear of no valid objection. He is opposed to State military academies, as not only uneconomical, but as tending to promote sectional feeling and military crotchets. These and other points we do not undertake to discuss. Whether the plan proposed is in all its details perfect, or how nearly perfect, it is not our province to say. But it seems to us clear that the main principle is sound, and worthy of general attention. Probably this is all that our author would claim.

11. — *The Origin of Human Races and the Antiquity of Man deduced from the Theory of "Natural Selection."* By ALFRED R. WALLACE. In the *Anthropological Review*. May, 1864.

MR. WALLACE, in this very well-written essay, makes an important contribution towards the clearing up of the great controversy of the Monogenists and the Polygenists. The firmest argument of those who advocate the original diversity of mankind has been that everywhere in *history* the evidence of the permanence of human types meets us. The differences that we can positively trace to variation are always most insignificant in amount compared with the extreme differences that exist, and that seem to have existed, side by side, perhaps in the same country, as far back as our evidence reaches. The monogenist "cannot show in a single case that at any former epoch the well-marked varieties of mankind approximated more closely than they do at the present day." Now this, though but negative evidence, still weighs heavily against the advocate of unity. After listening to his general arguments in favor of variation, the polygenist can always ask: "Why then do we never seize variation in the act? Why need this